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Abstract
With non-controllable auto-regressive shocks, the welfare of Ramsey optimal
policy is the solution of a single Ricatti equation of a linear quadratic regulator.
The existing theory by Hansen and Sargent (2007) refers to an additional Sylvester
equation but miss another equation for computing the block matrix weighting the
square of non-controllable variables in the welfare function. There is no need to
simulate impulse response functions over a long period, to compute period loss
functions and to sum their discounted value over this long period, as currently
done so far. Welfare is computed for the case of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve
with an auto-regressive cost-push shock.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models include auto-regressive shocks
(Smets and Wouters (2007)). For computing the welfare of Ramsey optimal policy in
DSGE models, one simulates impulse response functions over a long period, one computes
period loss functions and one sums their discounted value over this long period.
Since Anderson et al. (1996) and Hansen and Sargent (2007), the available theory uses
a Riccati equation for controllable variables and a Sylvester equation for non-controllable
variables in order to nd the optimal policy rule and the optimal initial condition for non-
predetermined variables. However, the matrix of the value function allowing to compute
welfare is incomplete. Even worse, computing welfare loss using only the two matrices
solutions of Riccati equation and of Sylvester equation may lead to a strictly positive
value, which is impossible. A third equation is missing in order to nd the matrix related
to the squares of the non-controllable variable in the value function.
We include in the Lagrangian the Lagrange multiplier times the dynamic equation
of the non-controllable variables. This Lagrange multiplier is omitted in Anderson et
al. (1996), p.202. Once this Lagrangian multiplier is included, the symmetry of the
Hamiltonian matrix for the full system of controllable and non-controllable variables is
restored. The value function is the solution of a Riccati equation for matrices related to
controllable and non-controllable variables.
In Anderson et al. (1996), the Riccati equation only on controllable variables and the
Sylvester equation only on non-controllable variables corresponds to two block matrix of
the solution of our Riccati equation. The missing block matrix for computing welfare
related to the square of non-controllable variables is found solving this Riccati equation.
This numerical solution of this Riccati equation is coded in the linear quadratic regu-
lator instruction lqr in SCILAB. We compute the welfare of Ramsey optimal policy for
the new-Keynesian Phillips curve with an auto-regressive cost-push shock (Gali (2015)).
2 The Welfare of Ramsey optimal policy
To derive Ramsey optimal policy a Stackelberg leader-follower model is analyzed where
the government is the leader and the private sector is the follower. Let kt be an nk  1
vector of controllable predetermined state variables with initial conditions k0 given, xt
an nx  1 vector of non-predetermined endogenous variables free to jump at t without
a given initial condition for x0, put together in the (nk + nx)  1vector yt = (kTt ;xTt )T .
The nu1 vector ut denotes government policy instruments. We include an nz1 vector
of non-controllable autoregressive shocks zt. All variables are expressed as absolute or
proportional deviations from a steady state.
The policy maker maximizes the following quadratic function (minimizes the quadratic
loss) subject to an initial condition for k0 and z0, but not for x0:
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where  is the policy makers discount factor. The policymakers preferences are the
relative weights included in the matrices Q and R. Qyy  0 is a (nk + nx)  (nk + nx)
positive symmetric semi-denite matrix, Ruu > 0 is a p  p strictly positive symmetric
denite matrix, so that the policy maker has at least a very small concern for the volatility
of policy instruments. The policy transmission mechanism of the private sectors behavior
is summarized by this system of equations:
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
=

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
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zt

+
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0

ut; (2)
where A is an (nk + nx + nz)  (nk + nx + nz) matrix and B is the (nk + nx + nz)  p
matrix of marginal e¤ects of policy instruments ut on next period policy targets yt+1.
The certainty equivalence principle of the linear quadratic regulator allows us to work
with a non-stochastic model (Anderson et al. (1996)). Anderson et al. (1996) is word by
word Hansen and Sargent (2007) chapter 5, so we refer only to Anderson et al. (1996) in
what follows.
The government chooses sequences fut;xt;kt+1g+1t=0 taking into account the policy
transmission mechanism (2) and boundary conditions detailed below.
Essential boundary conditions are the initial conditions of predetermined variables k0
and z0 which are given. Natural boundary conditions are chosen by the policy maker
to anchor the unique optimal initial values of the private sectors forward-looking vari-
ables. The policy makers Lagrange multipliers of the private sectors forward (Lagrange
multipliers) variables are predetermined at the value zero: @L
@x0
= x;t=0 = 0 in order
to determine the unique optimal initial value x0 = x

0 of the private sectors forward
variables.
Anderson et al. (1996) assume a bounded discounted quadratic loss function:
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which implies
lim
t!+1
tzt = z
 = 0, zt bounded,
lim
t!+1
tyt = y
 = 0, lim
t!+1
@L
@yt
= 0 = lim
t!+1
tt, t bounded.
The bounded discounted quadratic loss function implies to select eigenvalues of the
dynamic system such that
(2i )t < j2i j < 1 or equivalently such that: jij < 1=p.
A preliminary step is to multiply matrices by
p
 as follows:
p
Ayy
p
By in order to
apply the formulas of Riccati equations for the non-discounted linear quadratic regulator
augmented by auto-regressive shocks.
Assumption 1: The matrix pair (
p
Ayy
p
Byu) is Kalman controllable if the
controllability matrix has full rank:
rank
p
Byu AyyByu 
3
2A2yyByu ... 
nk+nx
2 Ank+nx 1yy Byu

= nk + nx: (4)
Assumption 2: The system is can be stabilized when the transition matrix Azz for
the non-controllable auto-regressive variables has eigenvalues such that jij < 1=
p
.
The policy makers choice can be solved with Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian
includes not only the constraints of the private sectors policy transmission mechanisms
multiplied by their respective Lagrange multipliers 2t+1t+1, BUT ALSO the con-
straints of the non-controllable variables dynamics with their respective Lagrange multi-
plier 2t+1t+1, which were omitted in Anderson et al. (1996), p.202.
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The rst order conditions are:
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The policy instrument are substituted by xt =  R 1Bt+1 in the transmission
mechanism equation. The Hamiltonian of the linear quadratic regulator has the usual
block matrices on left hand side and right hand side:
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
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with this particular block decomposition between controllable variables yt and non-
controllable variables zt:
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The specicity of non-controllable variables is that the following matrix includes three
blocks with zeros, which is not the case for controllable variables:
 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0
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0
T
=
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0 0

If L is non-singular, the Hamiltonian matrix H = L 1N is a symplectic matrix. With
the equations of the Lagrange multipliers t+1, all the roots i of Azz have their mirror
roots (1=i) which were all missing in Anderson et al. (1996).
The value function for welfare involve the matrix P such that:
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A stabilizing solution of the Hamiltonian system satises (Anderson et al. (1996)):
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The optimal rule of the augmented linear quadratic regulator is:
ut = Fyyt + Fzzt: (7)
The matrix P is solution of this Riccati equation:
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The matrix to be inverted in the Riccati equation is modied due to non-controllable
variables: 
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This Riccati equation is written as:
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where Pyy solves the matrix Riccati equation (Anderson at al. (1996)):
Pyy=Qyy + A
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where Fy is computed knowing Py:
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where Pyz solves the matrix Sylvester equation knowing Py and Fy (Anderson et al.
(1996)):
Pyz = Qyz +  (Ayy +ByFy)
T
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T
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where Pzz, which is missing in Anderson et al. (1996), solves the matrix Sylvester
equation knowing Py, Fy and Pyz:
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Now, at last, we know Pzz so that we can compute the welfare of Ramsey optimal
policy:
Proposition 1 The welfare of Ramsey optimal policy is:
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Proof. Welfare is a function of controllable non-predetermined variables x0, controllable
predetermined variables k0 and non controllable predetermined auto-regressive shocks z0:0
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Ramsey optimal initial anchor of non-predetermined variables x0 is (Ljungqvist L. and
Sargent T.J. (2012), chapter 19):
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Hence, the welfare matrix of Ramsey optimal policy is:0
@ 0  P 1xxPxk  P 1xxPxz0 I 0
0 0 I
1
AT
0
@ Pxx Pxk PxzPkx Pkk Pkz
Pzk Pzx Pzz
1
A
0
@ 0  P 1xxPxk  P 1xxPxz0 I 0
0 0 I
1
A
=
0
@ 0 0 0  (P 1xxPxk)T 1 0
  (P 1xxPxz)T 0 1
1
A
0
@ 0 0 00 Pkk  PkkP 1xxPxk Pkz  PkxP 1xxPxz
0 Pzx  PzkP 1xxPxk Pzz  PzkP 1xxPxz
1
A
=
0
@ 0 0 00 Pkk  PkkP 1xxPxk Pkz  PkxP 1xxPxz
0 Pzx  PzkP 1xxPxk Pzz  PzkP 1xxPxz
1
A
3 New Keynesian Phillips Curve Example
The new-Keynesian Phillips curve constitutes the monetary policy transmission mecha-
nism:
t = Et [t+1] + xt + zt where  > 0, 0 <  < 1,
where xt represents the output gap, i.e. the deviation between (log) output and its
e¢cient level. t denotes the rate of ination between periods t  1 and t and plays the
role of the vector of forward-looking variables xt in the above general case.  denotes the
discount factor. Et denotes the expectation operator. The cost push shock zt includes an
exogenous auto-regressive component:
zt = zt 1 + "t where 0 <  < 1 and "t i.i.d. normal N
 
0; 2"

;
where  denotes the auto-correlation parameter and "t is identically and independently
distributed (i.i.d.) following a normal distribution with constant variance 2" . The welfare
loss function is such that the policy target is ination and the policy instrument is the
output gap (Gali (2015), chapter 5):
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
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There is one controllable non-predetermined variable: xt = t. There is no controllable
predetermined variable (kt = 0). Galis (2015) calibration is:
p
A=
p
0:99

Axx =   1 = 10:99 Axz =   1 =   10:99
0 Azz =  = 0:8

,
p
B=
p
0:99

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 =  0:12750:99
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
, Q=

Qxx = 1 Qxz = 0
Qxz = 0 Qzz = 0

, R =

"
=
0:1275
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One multiplies matrices by
p
 in order to take the discount factor in the Riccati equation.
The welfare matrix is computed using SCILAB lqr instruction in the appendix:
P =

Pxx Pxz
Pxz Pzz

=

1:7518055  1:1389181
 1:1389181 3:4285107

Taking into account the optimal initial anchor of ination (0 = 0:65 for z0 = 1), the
welfare matrix is:
0  P 1xxPxz
0 1
T 
Pxx Pxz
Pxz Pzz

0  P 1xxPxz = 0:6504
0 1

=

0 0
0 Pzz  PxzP 1xxPxz

The welfare loss of Galis (2015) impulse response functions with Ramsey optimal initial
condition: 0 = 0:65 for z0 = 1 is:
W =    Pzz  PxzP 1xxPxz z20 =  2:688  z20
We found the same value simulating impulse response functions over two hundred periods,
computing period loss function and a discounted sum of these period loss functions over
two hundred periods. Additional results on this example can be found in Chatelain and
Ralf (2019).
Using only the information available in Anderson et al (1996), e.g. assuming Pzz = 0
for the missing block matrix in the value function, welfare loss would be strictly positive
PxzP
 1
xxPxz = 0:74 >  2:688, which is impossible.
This paper is part of a broader project which evaluates the bifurcations of dynamic
systems which occurs for Ramsey optimal policy versus discretion equilibrium (Chatelain
and Ralf (2021) or versus simple rules (Chatelain and Ralf (2020c). In particular, an Hopf
bifurcation occurs for the new-Keynesian model (Chatelain and Ralf (2020a)). Super-
inertial interest rate rules are not solutions of Ramsey optimal monetary policy (Chatelain
and Ralf (2020b). Ramsey optimal policy eliminates multiple equilibria such as the scal
theory of the price level in the frictionless model (Chatelain and Ralf (2020d) or in the
new-Keynesian model (Chatelain and Ralf (2020e)).
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4 Appendix
The numerical solution of the welfare matrix is obtained using Scilab code:
beta1=0.99; eps=6; kappa=0.1275; rho=0.8;
Qpi=1; Qz=0 ; Qzpi=0; R=kappa/eps;
A1=[1/beta1 -1/beta1 ; 0 rho] ;
A=sqrt(beta1)*A1;
B1=[-kappa/beta1 ; 0];
B=sqrt(beta1)*B1;
Q=[Qpi Qzpi ;Qzpi Qz ];
Big=sysdiag(Q,R);
[w,wp]=fullrf(Big);
C1=wp(:,1:2);
D12=wp(:,3:$);
M=syslin(d,A,B,C1,D12);
[Fy,Py]=lqr(M);
Py
Py(2,2)-Py(1,2)*inv(Py(1,1))*Py(1,2)
